MEDIATION BETWEEN STATE, CITY, AND CITIZENS: ARCHITECTURE ALONG THE TEL AVIV SHORELINE

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The development of the Tel Aviv shoreline in the 1930s (colonialism), the 1960s (nationalism), and the 1990s (globalization) personifies the unique role of architecture in mediating between state, city, and citizens. It indicates the role of architecture in demarcating spatial order and as a mediator between contesting forces, interests, and communities.
INTRODUCTION

As a leisure area, the beach is a space contested by city, state, and citizens. Having clear structural boundaries and functional organization, it is extra-territorial, a place where the body can temporarily escape sociospatial limitations (Lefebvre, 1991:384). For the individual, the beach provides a leeway from day-to-day social and cultural routines. It permits non-conformity, the uninhibited dress codes, and sexual permissiveness that are not tolerated in other parts of the city. The beach is often organized spatially, being culturally and climatically modified for specific rituals according to the position of the sun and the direction of the wind. Personal belongings such as towels, games, and sunshades demarcate territories and express the politics of the body in space. From this lack of rigidity and this freedom of expression derive the beach’s economic potential and real estate value. Many cities, such as Boston and Baltimore in the U.S. and London in the U.K., have transformed their industrial waterfronts into commercial leisure activities. But, as examples from other places show, seashore development is integral to the political construct of the city, especially in the socio-economy of the nation-state. Here, the beach’s economic potential is often confronted with conflicting local, national, and international forces, turning its development into an arena of struggle, not only against old forms of domination, but also against new patterns of control.

The coastline of Israel lies along the western edge of both the city and the state, making it a conflicted place of interests, powers, and ideologies. As both a municipal and a national asset, it is continuously revised according to the needs and desires of state and city alike. Like coastal cities elsewhere, Tel Aviv’s seashore development exemplifies current changes in the production of urban space and demonstrates the role of architecture in the context of late capitalism. However, in the midst of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, urban production in Tel Aviv is severely affected, although, ironically enough, the violent events accelerate the city’s urban production. This study, which focuses on three periods of shoreline development in Tel Aviv, critically considers the architectural production of the urban space. It regards the role of architecture in ordering space and society, examining its function as mediator between state, city, and citizens.

THE CONTEST BETWEEN URBAN PRODUCTION AND ARCHITECTURE AS A SPHERE OF MEDIATION

The production of modern urban space through professional practice in the service of capitalism is widely acknowledged (Benevolo, 1967; Choay, 1967; Foucault, 1980; Harvey, 1985; Jameson, 1991). Flexible accumulation has also been acknowledged as a leading force in urban production, especially in the context of late-capitalism, the long post-war wave of rapid growth in the international capitalist economy (Mandel, 1975), and its radical powers of globalization (Harvey, 1989). Capitalism produces landscapes appropriate to its own dynamic, only to have them destroyed and rebuilt to accommodate further accumulation (Harvey, 2000). To maintain capitalist order, the state uses experts — planners and architects — who legitimize the use of spatial resources (Harvey, 1985). Thus, as argued by Harvey (1985), leading architects and social experts such as Le Corbusier, Wiener, and Keynes acquire social power to the degree that their expertise becomes a vital material force. These relationships between spatial order and capital establish architecture not as a mere process of esthetic manipulations, but also as a means of grounding capitalism in material realities.

Despite attempts to undermine the city and regard the state as a collective national space (Anderson, 1983; Gellner, 1983; Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1983), the city continues to flourish as the center of capitalist accumulation (Holston and Appadurai, 1999). In the complex relationships between city and state, each manipulates the other to its own advantage. The city enlists the state to further its economic development, while the state uses the city to construct its national image (Vale, 1992). Marcuse and Van Kempen (2002) argue that “while the market is a major determinant of city form and spatial differences within cities, it is not itself an actor” (7). As they point out, “market forces are
the drivers (or struggle for the driver’s seat) and provide the fuel, but the engine, the steering wheel, and the accelerator are those of the state" (ibid.:7). Thus, while it is clear that architecture mediates between space and capital production, the modern state as a mobilizing force must not be underestimated.

Within this triangle of city, state, and capital production, the citizens are often perceived as the raw material with which the nation is constructed, but they are also perceived as the mass consumers of capital production. The complex relationships between state, city, and citizenship, especially in the contexts of capitalism, globalization, and increased cultural heterogeneity, have made architecture an axis of consumption and commodification. By giving form to ideas, architecture could initiate new levels of spatial understanding and thus motivate possible exchanges between different bodies engaged in spatial production. As a professional practice that takes upon itself to make the invisible visible and transform resources into concrete reality, architecture has become a contested sphere of representation of the physical and the imaginable (Lefebvre, 1991). Architecture could thus become a mediator, not merely between state and capital, but also between multiple participants and powers. Its formal manipulation of ideas can give voice to the voiceless, since the power exerted by architecture is created via social relationships (Foucault, 1980). It does not merely envision a future but is a social process of shared spatial construction, opening the route to collaboration and reciprocity. Being constructive and creative, architecture can be seen as a means of social change, mobilization, and mutual exchange, and cannot be comprehended as a mere repressive, economic, or legislative artifact (ibid.).

CONTESTED FORCES ALONG THE TEL AVIV SHORELINE

Architectural mediation is particularly relevant in Israel, where intricate city-state relationships are the result of the complex and multi-layered hierarchies of internal colonization (Kallus and Law-Yone, 2002). Regardless of the Zionist anti-urban movement, cities in Israel, even before the establishment of the state, were cores of a bourgeoisie based on a capitalist economy, while the development of the (rural) periphery was left to the “pioneers” who embodied the ethos and moral leadership of the new state. This tradition of cooperation between capitalism and the city (Ben Porat, 1999; Gozansky, 1986) was accompanied by a crucial ideological shift when the socialist principles of the Zionist pioneers were subordinated to the ethnic melting pot of the state (Sternhell, 1995). In return for a tacit laissez-faire, the bourgeoisie provided financial and moral support for Zionist “nation-building.” This unwritten agreement allowed for the institutionalization of a mutually agreed upon division of labor between the state and the owners of capital, obviously with spatial and architectural consequences. While the urban centers were grappling with definitions of the city based on real estate transactions, peripheral towns and villages were being defined as communal spaces, thus creating a sense of national unity and public participation (Kallus and Law-Yone, 2002).

Tel Aviv stretches along the shore, but its development as an urban center is not directly linked with the sea. Its early expansion to the north and the east was due to land availability (see Figure 1). As ordered later by the Geddes plan in 1927, many areas along the beach were designated for industries that would cause environmental pollution. Although the sea was considered as an ecological resource that would allow sea breezes to penetrate the city, this did not motivate seashore development, though it did influence layout and orientation of the streets (Geddes, 1925). This lack of official ordering is probably what gave the beach its sense of freedom which, in the 1920s, made it a vernacular space for popular leisure activities like bathing and strolling. As noted by Azaryahu (2001), the beach was detached from national revival and not fettered by the Zionist ideology; thus, it was not enlisted, as other resources were, into national state building.

However, the beach did present a great economic potential, which, since the 1920s, has motivated shoreline development over three periods of time and during three different sociopolitical orders. The first was in the 1930s, before the establishment of the state. During that period, Tel Aviv enjoyed
autonomous status during the British Mandate. Its Jewish municipality aimed at organizing the urban space with the assistance of the moneyed community and the support of the British regime. The second period was in the 1960s, a decade after the establishment of the state, and was based on official state cooperation. This administrative cooperation was manifested in national-municipal companies that created spatial order in line with the modernist project of progress and development. The third period, during the 1990s, was a period of accelerated globalization and transnational forces. Within its limited flexibility vis-à-vis the state, the municipality has tried to encourage the architectural practices that create the spatial concomitant with the vision of a “world city.” Although the state was powerful in this process, it was the municipality that master-minded the development, assisted by private developers, and frequently opposed by local groups. What is interesting is how architecture has created order and has functioned as a mediator in each of these periods. This is evident in three plans made for the Tel Aviv shoreline: The Gruenblatt Plan (1930s), Atarim Square (1960s), and the Dolphinarium (1990s).

The Gruenblatt Plan: A Beach Resort

To turn Tel Aviv into a second Nice would undeniably be a project worth considering. It should be remembered, however, that in Nice architects had to do the best they could in an admittedly difficult situation, and there was never any question of material amenities being destroyed in order to create artificial ones.

(Kramarski, 1937)

The Gruenblatt plan to develop the seashore as a tourist resort was promoted by Meir Dizengoff, Tel Aviv’s mayor in the 1930s. Disagreements about the plan arose because the city inhabitants assumed it to be a popular leisure area, while the city council recognized its
economic potential. Although the plan was never realized, its initiation and the struggle over it exemplify how it was used as a sphere of mediation between the city and its citizens. Its study assists us in understanding that the production of urban space results from sociopolitical order and its representation through architecture.

Tel Aviv under the British Mandate was able to function as an autonomous entity and with much latitude for constructing its sociospatial order (Home, 1997; Segev, 2000). In fact, the Tel Aviv municipality operated virtually independently, with its own administration and its own town planning committee. Regardless of the autonomy, the Jewish community adopted British planning standards and norms and mobilized the development of space according to its own interests. Under British rule, Tel Aviv was able to define its development and establish its hegemony as the Jewish economic and cultural center of nascent Israel.

Despite the leisure and fun activities of the Tel Aviv beach and its relatively short length, suggestions to turn it into a resort (Fogelson, 1927), or at least to improve and organize it (Bloch, 1927), were initiated as early as the 1920s. But the economic potential of the beach was only fully realized in the 1930s, and the city council initiated an architecture competition in 1933 for this purpose (Shifman, 1935). However, none of the proposals submitted won (Tel Aviv Council, 1934), and an alternative plan was commissioned by the mayor from the Jewish engineer Gruenblatt (see Figure 2).

Initially, Gruenblatt’s plan was rejected by the British, who demanded that the Tel Aviv planners also include European experts. It was ultimately submitted for review in 1933 and approved in 1936 (Yediot Iryat Tel Aviv, 1936). It included extending the shore by constructing sea walls and a tourist area with four- to five-story buildings. The land-use program consisted of hotels, clubs, and galleries around a central public garden, to be implemented by a private share company, which promised 15% of the site (after development) to the city (Yediot Iryat Tel Aviv, 1937-1938). This scheme was based on the Geddes plan, approved in 1927, but changed the scale and designation of the area so that it was defined as a tourist resort with European urban block typology. The shoreline was divided into three sections: the southern area bordering with Jaffa (sandy beach), the central area (sea-reclamation), and the northern area (sand beach). This division, although related to the existing city limits, deconstructed the shore into sociophysical fragments. The northern area was designated for the ci-
zens, the central area for tourists, and the southern area defined Tel Aviv’s border with Jaffa, so that the plan framed not only beach facilities and activities, but also the relationships between private and public property along the beach, as well as between communities and their spatial representation.

An important feature of the plan was its attempt to replace the traditional layout of Jaffa and Menshiyeh village along the beach with a European-colonial urban grid of wide streets and squares, completely negating existing urban pattern (Home, 1997). This, and the inclusion of European expertise, accelerated British approval of the plan. For the Jewish city founders, the adapted colonial planning approach achieved three goals simultaneously: a western image, promoting the marketing of the beach in Europe and encouraging foreign investment; the support of the colonial regime; and another level of spatial separation from Jaffa and the Arab community.
The plan’s dual approach, as an economic venture and as a popular leisure resource for city dwellers, was the key issue in the struggle over its suggested spatial order. Architecture was the negotiator between the city council and the citizens. One of the main arguments of the citizens against the plan was that the beach would no longer be accessible to them, as two-thirds of it would become a tourist quarter (The Palestine Post, 1937; Yediot Iryat Tel Aviv, 1937-1938). The plan was also attacked as a speculation that would compete with landlords and businessmen in other parts of the city (Kramarski, 1937). The city council, on the other hand, claimed that the project would contribute to the economy by creating jobs and increasing consumption and that the city would benefit from the architectural changes along the beach, which would affect real estate development (Roitman, 1937; Yediot Iryat Tel Aviv, 1937-1938). Above all, it was claimed that the plan would improve hygiene for both tourists and citizens (Yediot Iryat Tel Aviv, 1937-1938).

Negotiations around the plan and its physical-economic implications resulted in its rejection, although, as stated by the municipal engineer, “The Gruenblatt plan is only one possible solution, better then [sic] nothing, since it is dangerous not to organize the beach” (Shifman, 1938-1939:150). The problems were clearly the attempt to maintain order, define private-public relations, and safeguard the shoreline (Yediot Iryat Tel Aviv, 1939). Thus, the implementation consisted of an elevated promenade to cancel barriers between the city and the beach and to open the view to the sea (Shifman, 1938-1939, 1939-1940). This promenade, funded by the municipality with a British loan, “recognized” the sea as an open public space. As opposed to the Gruenblatt plan, which incorporated a new urban block, the new plan offered small-scale places for sitting and strolling. Photographs of the beach in the 1930s and 1940s, after the construction of the promenade, show lively cafes and clubs, indicating the important role of the beach (Shavit and Bigger, 2001) (see Figure 3).

However, like the Gruenblatt plan, the new layout was strongly connected to socioeconomic order and also employed capitalist tactics. Although offering an alternative physical solution that made it more acceptable to the citizens, it also divided the shoreline into linear strips of beach, promenade, streets, and buildings (hotels, clubs). These programmatic strips clearly defined the area for the citizens, testifying to the powerful status of Tel Aviv civil society during the British Mandate (Horowitz and Lissak, 1977). However, since the 1950s, the beach has become the locale of marginal groups, sewage has been dumped in the sea, and the city turned its back on the water until the initiation of new plans in the 1960s.

**Atarim Square: Facing the Tourists**

*To improve the behavior of the citizen who comes to the beach. To help to maintain cleanliness and proper behavior there. It has been shown that proper bathing conditions create high behavioral standards that allow enjoying the beach while keeping it clean.*

(Atarim, 1974:13)

The establishment of the state in 1948 changed the balance of power among bodies operating along the beach. The boundaries of the city changed following the annexation of Jaffa and the demolition of the Menshiyeh neighborhood (Segev, 2000; Yediot Iryat Tel Aviv, 1952). The city council and the government, adopting a spatial-political perspective, took the beach as the western frontier of both city and state and planned to turn it into a tourist attraction intended to promote Tel Aviv as a secular center in contrast to traditional religious tourist attractions such as Jerusalem, Nazareth, and Tiberius. This plan, a sharp contrast to the promenade layout of the 1930s that gave the beach to Tel Aviv’s citizens, exemplifies the use of architecture as a sphere of mediation between the state and the city (see Figure 4), but its lack of integration of the citizens’ needs and aspirations doomed it to failure.

The rationale behind the Atarim project was based on Tel Aviv as a tourist center and its proximity to the airport. It envisaged different developments along the beach by national-municipal companies (often with the mayor as the chairman) aiming to invest private capital in projects developed by

publicly initiated plans (Atarim, 1969). This beach development was intended to advance municipal interests along with national goals. The state’s financial and territorial assistance helped the city to sustain its status as a cultural and business center, thus maintaining its dominance over other urban centers, and to obtain public resources for future development (Piccinato, 1963a).

The recognition of Jaffa and Tel Aviv as a central national asset requiring development resulted in a number of large-scale plans for three areas of the shore: old Jaffa, Menshiyeh, and Machlul (see Figure 5). The Jaffa Development Company, established in 1962 in order to develop old Jaffa as a center for art, entertainment, and tourism, while preserving its unique character (Tel Aviv Council, 1970), operated in the south. Achuzot Hof Company, established in 1960 to develop a business center to regenerate the poor neighborhood in the city center (City Spokesman, 1961), was in charge of the Menshiyeh area, an Arab village destroyed during the 1948 war and later demolished by state order. The northern part of the beach — the Machlul neighborhood — a poor Jewish Mizrachi immigrants’ community, was undertaken by the Atarim Company, established in 1969. The city council also ordered two additional plans of which one was a general layout of the shoreline development made by the Italian town planner Luigi Piccinato in 1963. The second, made in 1964, was a master plan for Tel Aviv prepared by the Israeli town planner Zion Hashimshoni.

The rationale behind this double planning was to reinforce the city’s image and obtain state support. The city image was to be achieved by transforming Jaffa from a hostile urban center into an “old city” integral to Tel Aviv and its heritage. The promised public funding provided collateral for private investment while promising access to land entrusted to the state after the occupation of Jaffa. The master plan involved regenerating Jaffa to the south, a tourist center in the north, and a business center in-between, on the ruins of the Menshiyeh village. To understand the role of architecture in negotiations between the state, the city, and the citizens, we focus on the tourist center to the north, Atarim Square, built in the 1960s.
In an agreement between the city council and the treasury, the city was to evacuate the Machlul neighborhood and replace it with hotels, public gardens, and a promenade (Department for Development and Property, 1960). A national-municipal company was established (Treasury, 1960), but to accelerate the process, the city council delegated the evacuation of Machlul to Ezra and Bizaron, an established state-municipal company. At the same time, the Company for Developing Tourism commissioned a design for a commercial center, 25,000 square meters, from the architect Yakov Rechter. The main idea was to elevate the project above the six lane motorway along the shoreline (Hayarkon Street) by creating a square and commercial buildings over car parks (see Figure 6). To generate additional development (City Spokesman, 1968), the center was to supply tourist services and display a permanent exhibition of export products (City Spokesman, 1962).

In 1963, the city council also invited Professor Luigi Piccinato to prepare a master plan for the shoreline that would take into consideration all existing projects (Project Committee, 1962). Piccinato visited the city and met with the architects, then presented a report opposing many of the projects. His plan, modest and sustainable compared to those of the Israeli planners, was to preserve Jaffa Hill and Menshiyeh Bay, thus creating three new focal points along the beach (Piccinato, 1964:6-7). About the proposed tourist center, he argued that the layout was too dense and inappropriate for the site (Piccinato, 1963b). He publicly criticized the suggested parking lot and elevated construction above it as no more than an economic speculation. He believed that Tel Aviv should avoid the establishment of big concrete blocks and that the residents must participate in the planning processes (Piccinato, 1963c).

The mayor and the city council, asked to intervene in the dispute, submitted Atarim Square for redesign, asking architects to submit “plans that relate to Piccinato’s suggestions but substantially differ from it” (Amiaz, 1964). This conflict about the size and economic feasibility of the project resulted in a compromise, reducing the construction area to 18,000 square meters, though the final plan, approved in 1965, consisted of 19,400 square meters (Rabinovitch, 1965). It was implemented by the Atarim Company, intended to attract investment for future projects with 70% of premier investments covered by foreign investors (Atarim, 1974) because “this is how to combine public and private interests for the benefit of all” (ibid.:15).

Disassociated from the urban context and from city life, Atarim Square clearly demonstrates the cooperation between money, state, and city. The square is a purely commercial venture, whereby architecture reconstructs the city as a national image, creating a dialectic relationship with Jaffa. However, despite considerable success in property sales, services and rents could not support business, and the local crowd avoided the place. It is customary to blame the project’s failure on its design. This criticism, especially in postmodern architecture discourse, attacks the hierarchal separa-
tion between traffic and pedestrians, as well as the objectification of the space. The difficulty of reaching the square for pedestrians and their passive resistance to using the space is usually pointed out. The size of the project and how it cuts the continuity between the city and the shore, the blocked views to the sea, the sealed facades, and the restaurants facing the city rather than the sea, are all criticized (see Figures 7 and 8). However, the architecture is not solely responsible for its failure. If the planning process is a mediation sphere, in this case the relationship between all the participants failed. The linear strips of the 1930s that changed into focal centers along the beach in the 1960s have become sites that affect the city's everyday life. Beach development based on inward-facing centers with controlled circulation and regulated views clearly encourages consumerism, although attempting to create urban complexity in introverted urban objects is a universal trend and is not unique to Israel. One can only wonder where the state was and whose benefit it was serving in this development.

Tel Aviv Beach in the 1990s

National consensus in Israel has been changing since the 1990s, with public debates questioning Zionist ideology (Silberstien, 1999, 2002) and privatization and globalization increasing amidst the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian dispute (Ram, 1999; Shafir and Peled, 2000) and its effects on the urban space. Tel Aviv's southern beach in the 1990s presents a picture of stiff monochromatic spaces on one hand and a sensual experience on the other. The office towers planned for the Menshiyeh village in the 1960s are confronted with temporary areas of the beach organized for leisure activities, creating a complex social mosaic. Arabs and Jews share the grassy area stretching toward the beach, filling it with smells of food and voices of children. But all this ended on Friday evening, June 1, 2001, when a Palestinian suicide bomber killed himself in the midst of hundreds of youngsters crowding the entrance of a
nearby disco. The funerals of the dead a few days later exposed the complex identities of the local population. Moreover, the attack on a Jewish leisure center in front of an Arab mosque exacerbated the situation. The next day, a Jewish crowd threw stones at the mosque and called for revenge.

This intersection of time and space characterizes the architectural processes of the 1990s and their connection to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian dispute, the increasing immigration, and post-Zionism. Seizing this opportunity, the Tel Aviv Municipality tried to re-frame its vision of the city (Tel Aviv Council, 2002), attempting to restructure itself “horizontally,” freed from the hierarchical order of the 1960s. Through professional discourse, Tel Aviv now emphasizes its significance as a “world city,” an urban center capable of providing quality of life and services to suit the international businessman and the hi-tech community alike, with proximity to the airport, ample leisure areas, and expensive apartments modernized to international standards (Metropolitan Planning Team, 1996:11).

Nine months after the terrorist attack at the Dolphinarium, the city council called a public forum to discuss a new project. The Dolphinarium, designed in the 1960s as an ocean museum, has been partly abandoned since the 1980s and has been in use by light commerce. The municipality, perceiving it as an obstacle to the continuity of the promenade and the green belt along the beach connecting Tel Aviv and Jaffa (Planning Committee, 2002), has offered to exchange its lease rights for a public open space located across the street, close to the Hassan Beq mosque (Rotman Raz Architects, 2000) (see Figures 9 and 10). This exchange agreement provides the Dolphinarium lease holders with the right to construct tower buildings of 26-36 stories “continuous with the urban fabric (Planning Committee, 2002:5)” and enables the Council to develop the promenade (see Figures 9 and 10). In a sophisticated marketing move, the discussion of the project has shifted from the commercial venture to the promenade development, and in the name of “order,” “continuity,” and “regularity,” for the “benefit of the public,” it has been decided to evacuate the Dolphinarium and construct the new tower buildings near the mosque.

The new plan for the Dolphinarium exemplifies architecture as a mediation sphere between state, city, and the citizens. To better understand this, it is worthwhile to examine the public debate around this project and note the power relationships and strategies used by all the participants. As opposed to
the 1960s, the municipality today avoids any large-scale plans and tends to initiate only incremental projects whose programmatic and design features are decided without reference to a master plan. For statutory reasons and for the sake of feasibility, the municipality prefers to operate only in designated areas and does not propose long-term or wide-scale plans. Limited municipal resources require private investments that often do not match the needs and aspirations of the city inhabitants. The absence of the state in this process strengthens the tension between the moneyed community and the public, and in this absence of an official public voice, the emergence of civil groups who criticize municipal initiatives is most interesting. In addition, as in the 1930s, criticism is also heard from the city council itself. Does all this signify the emergence of a civil society?
The absence of a civic sphere in the 1960s changed in the 1990s to allow official public participation. Accordingly, the new Dolphinarium project debate has been taking place with the invited participation of professional civic bodies such as the Architectural Association and the Nature Reserve Society, not of the municipality, but cooperating with it. These groups use trendy professional jargon, but like the municipality officials, they do not live in the area. Thus, they ask for “architectural alternatives,” or argue that “the project is a mistake,” referring to the 1960s Atarim Square failure (Planning Committee, 2002:19). However, none of them negate the project or demand that it be replaced. They only ask to update it to fit their perspectives. As Ophir (2001) argues, these public hearings “up front” are based on rules that promise generality, though behind the curtains the debates are based on the production itself. Thus, as Ophir maintains, the questions are — Whose capital is invested? How can it be used, changed, or interested? Is it political, social, economic, or symbolic? (ibid.:130).

The Dolphinarium debate embodies the hierarchies of the social order of the city and its citizens, but it also presents the contradictions inherent in the plan and the complex interests involved in its fulfillment. Despite formal public debates, any criticism and suggestions for alternatives are limited by the capitalist reality of the plan. The municipality, aware of these contradictions, admits that “public participation applies to everyone” (Tel Aviv Council, 2002:145). Nonetheless, as it proclaims, “citizens and City Council members are included, but the citizens are right to mistrust the participation process” (ibid.). This lack of citizen confidence in institutional mechanism (city and state alike) is quite evident throughout the Dolphinarium debate. Thus, the public has no real influence, but is used by the municipality, through public participation, to achieve ostensible cooperation.

From the architectural perspective, replacing the Dolphinarium with a public park and high-rise developments along the beach negates the 1960s planning concept. The current approach reverts to the linear beach/promenade/street/buildings strips of the 1930s. This, of course, is due to statutory constraints and land availability, but it also echoes the current neo-capitalist order — the segregation...
between private (rich) and public (poor). Thus, although the spatial organization of the current approach is similar to the 1930s plan, the buildings' height and scale resemble the constructions of the 1960s, so that even though the architectural language and materials have changed since the 1960s, the buildings are designed in the modernistic tradition, as isolated entities in space.

It is easy to see how professional practice of the 1990s merges the urban perceptions of the 1930s with the national-capitalist character of the 1960s architectural projects (see Figure 11). Obviously, the present is a transitional phase of crossbred order between national and private market forces operating within complex global processes. This “glocalization” (Robertson, 1995) and its spatial expression do not necessarily signify the power of society or of particular groups. It expresses the complicated relationship between nation and state that influences the architectural order and the everyday life of the citizens.

**MEDIATION BY ARCHITECTURE**

The study of the Tel Aviv shoreline development demonstrates the tension between state and municipal apparatuses in their attempts to order the urban space and the inhabitants of that space. Through plans for future projects that transform ideas into reality, architecture is the mediator in this contested environment, integrating day-to-day spatial production with social and political discourse. Consideration of Tel Aviv seashore development reveals how architectural practice, through mediation, is strengthened by spatial controversies. However, although this spatial arbitration takes place in the public domain, groups apart from state and city hegemonies often lack power, indicating that spatial production tends to reinforce the powerful and maintain inequality. It is evident that architecture often caters to the demands of authority and capital and disregards the citizens.

In the 1930s, the Gruenblatt project attempted to reshape the beach. In the 1960s, mega-architecture was recruited by state ideology to construct its image. These processes were further accelerated by the...
violent events of the 1990s, when destruction promoted reconstruction. However, these events were inadequate for fostering social change. Nationwide terrorist attacks, disconnected from local socio-spatial implications, merely increased capital production, so that the violence in Tel Aviv actually furthered and legitimized urban development.

Over the years, the Tel Aviv shoreline has revealed the marginality of the inhabitants’ voice in development schemes. Unlike the 1930s, when citizens did participate in public debate, they have not been privy to the 1990s discussions. The municipality did initiate some public participation, proclaiming the need “to balance power in a democratic society and allow citizens’ groups to affect decisions, including those with no political power or resources” (Tel Aviv Council, 2002:144). Nonetheless, exchanges of ideas took place mainly at the official level.

In the context of late capitalism, urban space no longer pretends to be an equal territory. Postmodern conditions increase the influence of capital on urban production. As Jameson (1991) explains, architecture is closely allied to the economy, with which it develops unmediated relationships, so that the architects’ prosperity is attributable to the international business world. Aware of this, the Tel Aviv Municipality is attempting to regenerate its urban vision (Tel Aviv Council, 2002) by “horizontal” restructuring free from the hierarchical order of the 1960s. Through professional discourse, it continuously searches for economic leverage. The White City’s current recognition as a world heritage site by UNESCO (2003) is another asset that will promote urban real estate development.

The Tel Aviv shoreline development proves once again the importance of spatial order in urban production and the significance of architectural practice in transforming resources into reality. Capitalism is a leading force in urban production. However, as in Tel Aviv, architecture can also mediate between interests and powers. It can negotiate between participants, as well as between hegemonies and the fragile temporary order of the everyday. This study exposes the shortcomings of professional practice in accepting this role without any real attempt to challenge it. This is also due to inadequate professional criteria that would enable a complex and multi-layered approach to a site and its users. Despite increased public participation, and perhaps most of all, these shortcomings result from the architects’ lack of social commitment and their disinterest in political activism. If the potential for social change is ignored by architects, then their products are inevitably doomed to failure.

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